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The relationship between lobbying and campaign finance is complex, con-
tested, and changing. Lobbying and campaign finance are two important forms
of political activity that combine money and communication in ways that have
significant implications for democratic self-government. The two practices fre-
quently interact and reinforce each other, with individuals, organizations, and
interest groups deploying both lobbyists and campaign money to advance their
goals. Congress, in 2007, for the first time explicitly recognized the intersection
of campaign finance and lobbying when it adopted legislation specifically regu-
lating the campaign finance activities of lobbyists.1 At roughly the same time,
several of the leading candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination
clashed over the propriety of accepting campaign contributions from lobbyists.
2
Yet, lobbying and campaign finance also present different issues, and they
are generally governed by different statutory regimes. The importance of the
campaign finance/lobbying distinction was underscored in 2007 by the Su-
preme Court in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 3 which carved
out an enormous as-applied exception to Congress's limitations on corporate
and union campaign spending to assure that campaign finance law does not
constrain the ability of corporations and unions to undertake grassroots lobby-
ing expenditures. As WRTL indicates, lobbying is often subject to less restric-
tive controls than campaign finance, suggesting further that the two practices
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
1. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121
Stat. 735 [hereinafter Honest Leadership Act]; id. § 204 (regulating the disclosure of bundled
contributions); id. § 305 (prohibiting Members of the House of Representatives from partici-
pating in lobbyist-sponsored events during political conventions); id. § 542 (same prohibi-
tion for Senators).
2. See Ruth Marcus, Democrats' Purity Primary, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2007, at A17
(reporting that John Edwards and Barack Obama refuse to take lobbyists' contributions
while Hillary Clinton defends her acceptance of such contributions).
3. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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implicate different concerns.
Although both lobbying and campaign finance have each been the subject
of extensive scholarly treatment, relatively little attention has been paid to the
relationship between these two closely related, yet different activities, and the
regulatory regimes that deal with them. This Article constitutes a first effort at
probing the relationship between lobbying and campaign finance. The next Part
provides a brief overview of the commonalities, differences, and interactions of
campaign finance and lobbying. Part II compares the techniques that mark the
regulation of these two modes of political expenditure, and contends that these
differences reflect distinct goals. It suggests that transparency, enforced by re-
porting and disclosure requirements, plays and ought to play a bigger role in the
regulation of lobbying than in campaign finance. By contrast, egalitarian goals,
implemented by a mix of limits and subsidies, are more significant in the cam-
paign finance setting. A third goal-the control of improper or undue influ-
ence-is central for the regulation of both lobbying and campaign finance.
Part III addresses an area where these two fields are increasingly coming
together: the regulation of the campaign finance activities of lobbyists. In the
2007 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, Congress required cam-
paign committees to disclose substantial bundled contributions provided by
lobbyists. 4 Many states have enacted direct restrictions on lobbyists' campaign
contributions, bundling, and other forms of support for candidates' campaigns.
5
And former Senator John Edwards won significant attention in the summer of
2007 with his refusal to accept lobbyists' donations and his criticism of Senator
4. "Bundling" refers to the practice wherein an individual solicits, collects and aggre-
gates campaign contributions from multiple donors and then presents the resulting "bundle"
to a candidate. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 specifically de-
fines "bundled contribution" as a contribution "forwarded" from a contributor or contribu-
tors by a "person" to a candidate or political committee but "credited" by the recipient can-
didate or committee "to the person through records, designations, or other means of
recognizing that a certain amount of money has been raised by the person." Pub. L. No. 110-
81, § 204(a)(8)(A). "Bundling" causes concern because it can be a source of political influ-
ence for the bundler. Although campaign finance laws typically require the disclosure of do-
nations above a threshold level, and may set a dollar limitation on the size of the contribution
a donor can make, such laws generally do not require the disclosure of the identity of bun-
dlers or cap the total amount of contributions that any one bundler may bundle.
5. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.13.072(a)(4), 15.13.074(g) (2008) (prohibiting a lob-
byist from making a campaign contribution to any candidate for the state legislature other
than a candidate seeking election from the district where the lobbyist is eligible to vote);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2007) (prohibiting contributions by lobbyists to legis-
lators or the governor while the legislature is in session); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 85702 (2007)
(prohibiting lobbyist from making a contribution to any candidate for state office that the
lobbyist has registered to lobby); MD. CODE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 15-714(d) (West 2008)
(prohibiting lobbyists from serving as treasurer for a candidate for state-wide or legislative
office, serving on the fund-raising committee for such a candidate, or soliciting contributions
for such a candidate); MINN. STAT. § 10A.27 (2007) (limiting the percentage of total contri-
butions a candidate may accept from lobbyists); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 120C-302 (2007) (pro-
hibiting lobbyists from making or bundling contributions).
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Hillary Clinton over her failure to follow suit. When they occur together, lob-
bying and campaign contributions can compound the dangers of undue influ-
ence that each practice presents separately. But it is not clear that singling out
lobbyists' campaign contributions for special regulation makes sense. Lobbying
and campaign contributions can both be instruments for seeking influence. Al-
though some lobbyists are powerbrokers in their own right, for the most part
that influence is deployed on behalf of the lobbyists' clients, not the lobbyists
themselves. Senator Clinton's position that the real problem is not the lobbyists
but the interest groups they represent seems right. Campaign finance practices
like bundling that can be sources of influence over candidates and officeholders
should be regulated generally and not just when engaged in by lobbyists. On
the other hand, there may be some situations where the campaign activities of
lobbyists provide special influence for lobbyists above and beyond the benefits
to their clients; in those cases, regulations aimed at lobbyists may be appropri-
ate.
I. COMMONALITIES, DIFFERENCES, AND LINKAGES
A. Similarities
Both lobbying and campaign finance are vital to representative democracy.
Lobbying helps elected officials obtain the information they need to develop
legislative or regulatory initiatives; to assess how proposals for government ac-
tion will affect specific interests, industries, constituencies, or society at large;
to determine how different groups view particular policy alternatives; and to
decide how they will vote on the measures that come before them. By the same
token, individuals, organizations or groups affected by government action or
seeking government assistance to deal with a political, economic, or social
problem engage in lobbying in order to present public officials with the facts
and arguments they believe support their positions.
Like lobbying, campaign finance also involves information and communi-
cation. Campaign expenditures supply the voters the information they need to
select among competing candidates or to make a decision concerning a ballot
proposition. Campaign expenditures enable candidates, parties, political com-
mittees and interest groups to present their views to the voters to influence the
electorate's decisions with respect to the election of public officials or the ap-
proval or rejection of ballot measures. Campaign contributions enable candi-
dates, parties, committees, and groups to pay for those campaign expenditures.
Given their critical roles in enabling democratic self-government, it is not sur-
prising that both lobbying and campaign expenditures are protected by the
Constitution-specifically, the First Amendment guarantees of the right to peti-
tion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of association. 6
6. See, e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954) ("[T]he freedoms guar-
2008]
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Lobbying and campaign finance, however, also raise common concerns
about unequal wealth and improper influence over the political process. Both
lobbying and campaigning depend on the use of money, and money is radically
unequally distributed in our society. Individuals, organizations, and interest
groups with greater financial resources have an advantage in gathering informa-
tion, undertaking analyses, and presenting facts and arguments to government
officials, much as the well-funded can more easily engage in direct communi-
cations with the voters or provide candidates with the financial support they
need to campaign. And, of course, candidates with more resources-either their
personal funds, or funds provided by donors-have an advantage in campaign-
ing. To be sure, inequalities in wealth do not fully determine either lobbying or
election results. Numbers of supporters, organizational ability, intensity of ef-
fort, and substantive positions on issues all affect electoral and legislative out-
comes. But money can matter to a degree that is in tension with the formal po-
litical equality of citizens.
Campaign finance and lobbying also raise concerns about improper influ-
ence, or corruption, that is, the danger that government officials will make de-
cisions based on their own private benefit-whether to aid their reelection ef-
forts or to add to their personal wealth-rather than the public interest. As the
Supreme Court recognized in upholding the contribution restrictions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act, "[t]o the extent that large contributions are
given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office hold-
ers, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined."
'7
The Court has emphasized that improper influence is not limited to outright
bribery but also extends "to the broader threat from politicians too compliant
with the wishes of large contributors."'8 So, too, in cases dating back to the
nineteenth century, the Court has expressed concern about the corrupting ef-
fects of "the influence and exertions of the lobby agent to bring about the pas-
sage of a law." 9 Both campaign finance and lobbying are also regulated not
simply because of the possibility of actual corruption but because of the poten-
tially demoralizing effects on public confidence in government of the "appear-
ance of corruption" attributable to unrestricted contributions10 or the "direct ac-
cess to elected representatives" enjoyed by lobbyists. 1 1
As a response to these common concerns, lobbying and campaign finance
regulation are subject to some similar regulations. At the federal level, and in
anteed by the First Amendment-freedom to speak, publish, and petition the Government"
are involved in the assessment of lobbying regulation.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15
(1976) (Campaign finance regulation implicates "the most fundamental First Amendment
activities" of freedom of speech and association.).
7. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27.
8. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
9. Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. 441,451 (1874).
10. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
11. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 n.20 (1995).
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many states, both lobbyists and political committees may be required to regis-
ter, and to report, for public disclosure, information about their finances and
expenditures. Federal and state laws may forbid activities particularly associ-
ated with improper influence, such as cash contributions above a de minimus
level in the campaign finance setting, 12 or the giving of gifts to public officials
in the lobbying context.1 3 Regulations may also target certain actors deemed
especially problematic. Congress prohibits corporations and unions from mak-
ing campaign contributions and expenditures.14 So, too, because of the danger
that they may be able to trade on inside knowledge and close social ties, Con-
gress imposes "revolving door" restrictions on the ability of former members of
Congress and former congressional staffers to lobby Congress.15
B. Differences
Despite these similarities, lobbying and campaign finance present many
differences, reflected in regulatory structures and techniques. Lobbying and
campaign finance are subject to different statutory regimes with different rules
and different enforcement bodies. At the federal level, for example, campaign
finance is regulated primarily by the Federal Election Campaign Act, as
amended, 16 while lobbying is subject to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, as
amended, 17 most recently by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act
of 2007.18
Campaign finance practices are generally more tightly regulated than lob-
bying. Although both campaigns and lobbying are subject to disclosure re-
quirements, campaign finance disclosure is generally more penetrating. At the
federal level, the threshold for reporting is lower for campaigns than for lobby-
ing, 19 more information is required about campaign donations and expenditures
than about lobbying expenses, and campaign reports are required more fre-
quently.2
0
12. 2 U.S.C. § 441g (2008) (prohibiting cash contributions of more than $100).
13. See Honest Leadership Act § 204, 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2008) (ban on gifts to Senators
from registered lobbyists and entities that hire registered lobbyists).
14. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2008).
15. Honest Leadership Act § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2008).
16. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (2008)).
17. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2008)).
18. Honest Leadership Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (2007).
19. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 434 (b) (2008) (requiring disclosure of certain information
concerning donors of $200 or more), with 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2008) (setting reporting thresh-
old for lobbying activities at $2500, and setting threshold for disclosure of information con-
cerning clients at $5000).
20. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (2008) (requiring pre-election and post-election reports
in addition to quarterly reports for the campaign committees of candidates for the House and
20081
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More importantly, campaign finance laws generally go well beyond disclo-
sure, and impose direct restrictions on the provision and use of campaign
money. Federal law, for example, sets dollar limitations on donations by indi-
viduals to candidates, political parties, and political committees, and on contri-
butions by parties and political committees to candidates. 2 1 As already noted,
federal law prohibits campaign contributions and expenditures by significant
classes of actors-corporations and unions.22 Campaign finance laws may also
provide for direct financial support to candidates and parties through programs
that give flat grants or matching funds to candidates or parties who qualify for
public support. Federal law offers public funding to candidates for the presi-
dency; many states and local governments make public funding available for
state and local legislative candidates as well. 23 Overall, campaign finance laws
seek to shape, structure, and limit campaign finance practices to a considerable
degree.
Lobbying regulation has traditionally been much less ambitious. With the
very limited exception of "revolving door" restrictions24 and rules limiting lob-
bying by the close relatives of elected officials, 25 lobbying laws do not limit
lobbying-that is, the communication of information and arguments by lobby-
ists to public officials concerning subjects of legislative or administrative ac-
tion-at all. Lobbying laws may limit or forbid ancillary activities, such as gifts
to public officials, or payments for their meals, entertainment, or travel costs-
which provide private benefits to public officials and, thus, can constitute a
source of improper influence. But they do not restrict either the amount of
money that can be spent on the research, informational and communications
activities at the heart of lobbying, nor do they seek to limit the amounts or
sources of funds used to pay for lobbying expenditures. Moreover, there are no
public funds for lobbying; lobbying is financed entirely out of private re-
sources.
2 6
Senate and monthly reports during an election year by the committees of presidential candi-
dates), with 2 U.S.C. § 1604 (2008) (just amended to require quarterly instead of semiannual
reports by lobbyists).
21. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2008).
22. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2008).
23. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L.
REv. 563 (1999).
24. "Revolving door" rules impose temporal restrictions on the ability of former execu-
tive officials, legislative officials, or legislative staff members to lobby the agency or legisla-
tive chamber in which they worked. See, e.g., Honest Leadership Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81,
§§ 101-105 (2007).
25. See, e.g., id. §§ 302, 552 (restrictions on lobbying by spouses and immediate family
members of members of Congress).
26. Indeed, federal law is careful to deny tax subsidies to lobbyists. Lobbying expendi-
tures do not qualify for tax deductibility as business expenses. See generally Timothy W.
Jenkins & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Internal Revenue Code Limitations on Deductibility of Lob-
bying Expenses by Businesses and Trade Associations, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A
COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAW GovERNING LAWYERS AND LOBBYISTS 227 (William V.
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C. Linkages
Lobbying and campaign finance are often closely linked. Campaign contri-
butions can be used to advance lobbying goals. Lobbying is intended to influ-
ence governmental action. One of the most effective lobbying techniques is
personally meeting with the government officials who have the power to decide
whether government will take the action desired.27 Lobbyists believe that cam-
paign contributions "open doors" and enable them to obtain the "access" to
elected officials and their staffs necessary to personally present the information
and arguments that support their positions on legislative issues.2 8 Indeed, in
McConnell v. FEC,29 the Supreme Court expressly tied the constitutionality of
the limitations on soft money donations to political parties imposed by the Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 to evidence that such contributions
were given to enable the donors to obtain access to members of Congress.
30
To be sure, most lobbyists do not make campaign contributions.3 1 But the
most active lobbyists are frequent and significant donors. In a recent survey
Public Citizen found that in the period from 1998 through 2005, only about
one-quarter of federally registered lobbyists made campaign contributions in
excess of $200-the federal campaign contribution reporting threshold-to a
single congressional candidate or a political action committee (PAC). 32 But in
that same period, six percent of all lobbyists accounted for eighty-three percent
of all lobbyists' campaign contributions. 33 Moreover, lobbyists' contributions
of personal funds represent only a small portion of lobbyists' support for candi-
dates' campaigns. Lobbyists sponsor fundraisers and they solicit and collect
contributions from others and deliver them to candidates-the practice known
as bundling. 34 According to Public Citizen, Jack Abramoff's $180,000 in per-
sonal campaign contributions over a seven-year period was just seven percent
of the $2.6 million that he helped direct to congressional candidates during
roughly the same time.
35
More generally, politically active individuals, organizations, and interest
Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman eds., 3d ed. 2005). Charitable organizations will forfeit
their tax-exempt status if more than an "insubstantial part" of their activities is devoted to
lobbying. Id. at 243-49.
27. See ANTHONY J. NowNEs, TOTAL LOBBYING: WHAT LOBBYISTS WANT (AND How
THEY TRY To GET IT) 200 (2006).
28. Id. at 80-81.
29. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
30. Id. at 146-54.
31. NOWNES, supra note 27, at 80.
32. PUB. CITIZEN, THE BANKROLLERS: LOBBYISTS' PAYMENTS TO THE LAWMAKERS
THEY COURT, 1998-2006, at 7 (2006), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/BankrollersFinal.pdf.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Id. at 24-26.
35. Id. at 8-9.
2008]
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groups use lobbying and campaign contributions together to advance their
goals. Both lobbying and campaign finance are means to the end of influence
over government action. Lobbying involves individuals and interests making
their cases for specific bills, amendments, tax breaks, or other measures. Cam-
paign money-both contributions and independent expenditures-works with
lobbying by promoting the election of officials more amenable or sympathetic
to the donors' and spenders' goals, and by facilitating access to elected offi-
cials. Although most campaign spenders and donors do not lobby, and most or-
ganizations that engage in lobbying do not engage in campaign finance activi-
ties, 36 the individuals and groups that both lobby and make campaign
contributions account for most political expenditures and for an even higher
share of PAC contributions. 37 The individuals and groups that engage in both
lobbying and giving campaign money are particularly interested in obtaining
specific benefits from the political process, whereas individuals and groups that
make campaign contributions without also engaging in lobbying are typically
less interested in securing specific measures and more focused on influencing
the ideology of elected officials.
38
II. REGULATORY TECHNIQUES AND POLICY GOALS
As previously indicated, the principal mode of lobbying regulation, par-
ticularly at the federal level, is disclosure-the formal name of the federal lob-
bying law is the Lobbying Disclosure Act, and the 2007 law is billed as the
"Honest Leadership and Open Government Act"-while most federal and state
campaign finance laws limit key activities, and some provide subsidies. This
has two implications worth considering. First, campaign finance law is far more
concerned about equality than is lobbying law. Second, a primary regulatory
emphasis on disclosure makes far more sense in the lobbying setting than in
campaign finance given what exactly disclosure can-and cannot-accomplish.
These differences are linked to the differences between the goals of lobbying
and campaign finance-influencing legislative decision-making concerning in-
dividual measures for the former, and affecting the election of government offi-
cials with broad powers over a wide range of areas in the latter.
A. Equality
A concern about political equality, or at least about constraining the impact
of inequalities of wealth on the electoral process, is one of the driving forces
36. See, e.g., Micky Tripathi, Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Are PAC
Contributions and Lobbying Linked? New Evidence from the 1995 Lobby Disclosure Act, 4
Bus. & POL. 131, 133 (2002) (noting that only one-fifth of groups studied that employ a lob-
byist also have a political action committee).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 133-34.
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behind campaign finance law. Indeed, much of campaign finance law can be
seen as ameliorating the conflict between an electoral structure built on "one
person, one vote," that is, on the equal voice of each adult resident citizen in the
electoral process, and a campaign finance system which, if left unregulated,
would enable the wealthy to play a far greater role in attempting to influence
electoral outcomes. Contribution restrictions cap the ability of the wealthy to
give more to the candidates they support, thus limiting the campaign advan-
tages that the candidates backed by the wealthy might otherwise enjoy. The
prohibition on corporate expenditures prevents firms from using 'resources
amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair advantage in the po-
litical marketplace.' ' 39 By providing an alternative source of campaign funds,
public subsidies "reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our
political process."'40 Admittedly, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo fa-
mously rejected equality as a justification for limiting campaign expenditures, 4 1
but the Court's validations of contribution limits, of prohibitions on corporate
expenditures, and of the provision of public funding to qualifying candidates
explicitly or implicitly rely at least in part on egalitarian concerns. 42
Political equality plays a far smaller role in lobbying regulation. There are
both operational and conceptual reasons for this. Operationally, it is difficult to
imagine a set of rules that could give each adult resident citizen an equal say on
every issue subject to lobbying without choking off lobbying itself. Capping the
amounts an individual or group could spend either on hiring a lobbyist or on
lobbying personally would cut directly into the amount of lobbying the individ-
ual or group could undertake. The Supreme Court has upheld caps on campaign
contributions, notwithstanding the resulting potential to limit resources avail-
able to candidates and parties, because donors may still spend money on inde-
pendent expenditures that promote or oppose a candidate, and because the law
does not limit the ability of candidates and parties to replace the funds lost from
the capping of large donations by widening the pool and raising more funds in
smaller amounts from additional donors.4 3 In the lobbying setting, the equiva-
lent of independent expenditures is, of course, lobbying itself. As most issues
subject to lobbying affect a relatively small number of people, organizations or
groups, there is unlikely to be a pool of additional donors to offset any cap on
39. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (citing
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976).
41. Id. at 48-49; see also Randall v. Sorrell, 584 U.S. 230 (2006).
42. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 660 (citing the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political ideas" in
upholding state prohibition of corporate campaign expenditures); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27
(invoking the "opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual contributions"
in sustaining contribution limits); id. at 91 (citing the benefit of "reduc[ing] the deleterious
influence of large contributions on our political process" to support public funding).
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22, 28-29.
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contributions to pay for lobbying. As a result, lobbying contribution restrictions
would most likely produce a limitation on informational and communicative
activities rather than cause those engaged in them to develop a broader base of
financial support, as occurs in the campaign finance setting. So, too, with thou-
sands upon thousands of bills, amendments, appropriations, regulations, and
other measures subject to lobbying each year, it is difficult to imagine exactly
how subsidies would be provided, how their amounts would be calculated, or
who would receive them.
As the operational difficulties indicate, given the sharp differences in inter-
ests in particular legislative measures, there is no reason to believe that all citi-
zens ought to have an equal voice in the lobbying of each specific bill or
amendment. To be sure, all citizens are equally interested in the aggregate con-
sequences of lobbying, which is the overall output of government, but that con-
cern is addressed by giving each citizen an equal voice in elections, and, to
some extent, by campaign finance regulations. Political equality does not re-
quire a "one person, one lobbying voice" for each legislative matter. A closer
question is whether equality concerns are triggered when individuals or interest
groups clash over specific lobbyable legislative measures. Should lobbying law
try to equalize the funds spent by competing forces or require that lobbying ex-
penditures reflect the extent of underlying political support for the lobbied posi-
tion? The short answer, as Dean Kathleen Sullivan has explained, is that out-
side of elections "conventional First Amendment principles generally preclude
a norm of equality of influence" that would justify limits on political speech in
order to equalize the communicative impact of political competitors. 4
4
Of course, egalitarian concerns do play some role in lobbying regulation.
All citizens have a formal equal right to seek to lobby their legislature, and all
individuals, organizations, or interest groups affected by a legislative proposal
should have an equal opportunity to present their case to the legislature. The
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code precluding the deductibility of lobby-
ing costs as business expenses and limiting the ability of tax-exempt charities to
lobby may be seen as intended to maintain a level playing field among compet-
ing lobbyists.45 On the other hand, the tax code's restrictions on the lobbying
activities of not-for-profit organizations may also have the effect of limiting the
ability of non-business groups to counter the lobbying influence of for-profit
actors. This, however, is not a matter of the political equality of individuals per
se, but of structuring fair competition among contending interest groups. Fair
competition is further addressed by the disclosure requirements and restrictions
on improper influence that are the principal techniques of lobbying regulation.
44. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAvIS L.
REv. 663, 673 (1997).
45. See Honest Leadership Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81, §§ 302, 552 (2007) (restrictions
on lobbying by spouses and immediate family members of members of Congress).
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B. Disclosure
Both campaign finance law and lobbying regulation rely heavily on disclo-
sure. Campaign finance laws require candidates to disclose their expenditures
above a certain amount and the contributions they have received above a
threshold level, including the reporting of identifying information about donors.
Political parties and political committees that make contributions to or expendi-
tures in support of or opposition to candidates are subject to comparable disclo-
sure requirements. Disclosure is even more central to lobbying. Lobbyists who
expend above a threshold sum of money on lobbying are required to disclose
their expenditures, provide identifying information about clients who pay them
above a threshold amount, and indicate the subjects of their lobbying activity.
The contents of lobbying disclosure have been sharply criticized-for failure to
require more precise information concerning the bills or other measures that are
the subject of lobbying or the elected officials lobbied-but there is no doubt
that disclosure is the critical weapon in the lobbying regulation arsenal. Indeed,
disclosure looms much larger in the lobbying setting-where there are no con-
tribution or expenditure limits and no public subsidies-than in campaign fi-
nance.
This makes a great deal of sense, not only because of the lack of fit be-
tween contribution and expenditure limits and lobbying, as already discussed,
but because disclosure can actually accomplish more in the lobbying setting.
Although disclosure has been a centerpiece of campaign finance regulation at
least since the federal Publicity Act of 19 10,46 it has never been precisely clear
what campaign finance disclosure accomplishes. According to the Supreme
Court, the primary purpose of disclosure is voter information:
[Disclosure] allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum
more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and
campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert
the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive
and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.4 7
The Court also found that the prospect of disclosure discourages potentially
corrupting contributions.4 8 However, given that federal law prohibits contribu-
tions over a statutory ceiling-currently $2300-the contribution limit proba-
bly takes care of the corruption danger in federal elections. As a result, the
chief justification for campaign finance disclosure is voter information. 49
The voter information benefit of disclosure, however, is almost surely
overstated. Full disclosure of campaign contributions produces mountains of
46. 36 Stat. 822, ch. 392
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.
48. Id.
49. Buckley provided a third "and not least significant" justification for disclosure-
that it is "an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of the con-
tribution limits." Id. at 67-68.
2008]
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data that must be exhaustively mined and analyzed to reveal significant patterns
of giving and spending. The effectiveness of disclosure relies, in significant
part, on the media's interest in examining the available information and pre-
senting it to the public in useful form before the election. More importantly,
even if key campaign finance information is available to the voters in an under-
standable form and a timely manner, the voters may be unable to use it. On
Election Day, voters are presented with a highly constrained choice of a limited
number--often just two-candidates for each office. Many large donors give to
more than one candidate in the same race, or to the national committees of both
major parties. Voters can do little to punish the candidates or parties that re-
ceive donations the voters find troubling if both major party opponents have
received funds from those sources. Moreover, even if only one candidate has
received funds from a "tainted" source, the voter may be unable to act on that
information. Each voter has just one vote per election. She must make up her
mind based on multiple, potentially competing issues-national security, taxa-
tion, the economy, social and cultural concerns, and the candidates' personali-
ties and histories. For most voters, it is doubtful that campaign contributions are
at the top, or even in the middle, of this list of concerns. The vote is simply too
blunt an instrument for the voter to make her views about the candidates' con-
tributors known.
A recent study of disclosure policy found that "the linchpin of effective
transparency was the connection between information and action."'50 Disclosure
requirements were effective "only when they provided facts that people wanted
in times, places, and ways that enabled them to act."'5 1 Disclosure was least
likely to succeed in changing the behavior of either disclosers or the users of
disclosed information when "many users faced a limited set of choices and so
could not act on new information" or the "new information was not compatible
with the preexisting decision processes of would be information users."'52 That
pretty much sums up the dilemma of voters who are presented with campaign
contribution information but are unable to use the data to choose between can-
didates. Given the likely priority of the candidates' positions on substantive po-
litical issues, campaign finance data simply may not be part of most voters' de-
cision-making processes. Indeed, disclosure without voter response could have
the perverse effect of disguising from elected officials the voters' views about
their campaign finance sources: "Political candidates may have no way of per-
ceiving and reacting to voter dissatisfaction with their disclosed sources of fi-
nancing because no feedback process exists."
'53
Lobbying is quite different. Disclosure of the amount of money spent on
50. ARCHON FLING, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY, at xiv (2007).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 88.
53. Id. at 67.
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lobbying, the sources of a lobbyist's funds, and the issues lobbied can inform
three groups: the legislators lobbied, competing interest groups, and the general
public. The Supreme Court cited the first informational benefit--disclosure to
legislators-when it upheld the LDA's predecessor, the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act, in United States v. Harriss.54 As the Court explained,
"[p]resent-day legislative complexities are such that individual members of
Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to which they are
regularly subjected."' 55 Disclosure enables the members of Congress "to know
who is being hired, who is putting up the money, and how much."'56 While it
seems implausible that in many cases elected officials would not know which
interests a lobbyist is representing when she makes arguments for or against a
particular bill or amendment, disclosure can give legislators a better sense of
the scope of the interests implicated by a particular measure, the positions of
the contending groups, and the extent and intensity of the lobbying effort.57
The second consequence-informing competing interest groups-is per-
haps even more important. As Professor Krishnakumar has recently pointed
out, one great benefit of lobbying disclosure is that it "enables interest groups
to discover which lobbyists their competitors have hired, how much their com-
petitors have spent on lobbying, the general issues on which their competitors'
lobbying activities have focused, and even, to some extent, the federal depart-
ments or congressional committees that have been lobbied on their competitors'
behalves. ''58 And whereas there is little that most voters realistically can do
with disclosed campaign finance information, lobbying disclosure can effec-
tively be put to use by competing interest groups who can "step-up their own
lobbying efforts to match those of their competitors. ''59 Indeed, as Professor
Krishnakumar suggests, lobbying disclosure can promote the goal of fair com-
petition among interest groups in the "familiar Madisonian fashion of allowing
factions to check factions in the service of the public good. ' '60
54. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
55. Id. at 625.
56. Id.
57. Disclosure would provide useful information about the sources of funds behind
lobbying efforts if it were extended to grassroots lobbying campaigns. Indeed, Harriss indi-
cated that Congress had a legitimate interest in learning the identities of those responsible for
"an artificially stimulated letter campaign." Id. at 620. The federal Lobbying Disclosure Act
of 1995, however, does not include grassroots lobbying in its definitions of either "lobbying
contact" or "lobbying activity" and the legislative history of the LDA suggests that it was not
intended to cover grassroots lobbying. See William V. Luneburg & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, The
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995: Scope of Coverage, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note 26, at 33, 45-47; accord Elizabeth Garrett, Ronald M. Levin & Theodore Ruger, Consti-
tutional Issues Raised by the 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, su-
pra note 26, at 143, 149-50.
58. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Towards a Madisonian, Interest-Group Based Approach to
Lobbying Regulation, 58 ALA. L. REv. 513, 542 (2007).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 543.
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Finally, lobbying disclosure informs the general public about the extent of
lobbying expenditures, the identities-including business, ideological, ethnic
group or other affiliations-of the key players, and the subjects of lobbying ac-
tivities. This can enhance public understanding of how government works and
what factors affect government decisions in general, as well as provide an
awareness of which groups are engaged in influencing particular policies and
which policies are being pushed. Lobbying disclosure is potentially more useful
in influencing public action than election finance disclosure since in the legisla-
tive setting, unlike the electoral context, the public has a far greater array of op-
tions than the binary choice of "vote for candidate A," or "vote for candidate
B." Moreover, lobbying disclosure could have long-term consequences for po-
litical activity, with implications far beyond the lobbying topic subject to dis-
closure. Disclosure could even be an impetus for the organization of new "pub-
lic interest"-type lobbies to counter existing lobbying groups and for public
agitation for reform.
6 1
The different roles of equality concerns and disclosure in campaign finance
and lobbying are, thus, closely linked to the differences between elections and
legislation. Elections occur at fixed and regular moments; pit a sharply limited
number of opposing candidates against each other; and determine which indi-
viduals will hold power and have the opportunity to make decisions that govern
the entire polity for the period until the next election. The broad impact of elec-
tions on the polity as a whole militates in favor of widespread suffrage, equally
weighted votes, and an electoral system in which all have an equal voice. "One
person, one vote" may not literally require "one person, one dollar of campaign
money," but campaign finance laws promote political equality by constraining
the impact of wealth inequalities on the campaign finance system. Disclosure is
less valuable because the restricted set of choices available in most elections
limits the ability of voters to use disclosed campaign finance information when
voting.
Lobbying, by contrast, deals with the communication by individuals, or-
ganizations, and interest groups with government officials. This can occur at
any time and with respect to a limitless number of subjects, with an equally
limitless number of proposals and permutations of proposals concerning those
subjects. These issues will typically affect the citizenry quite differently. The
vast majority of people have vastly different degrees of interest in each poten-
tial lobbying subject. Hence, although all people must be free to lobby concern-
ing matters that are of interest to or that affect them, political equality is diffi-
cult both to conceptualize and to operationalize in the lobbying context. There
is a "Madisonian" 62 value in assuring that conflicting interest groups have
61. Indeed, this impact on overall public understanding of the political process, with
the potential for agitation for change, could be the best argument for campaign finance dis-
closure, rather than the Supreme Court's argument, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67
(1976), that disclosure will inform how voters cast their ballots in a particular election.
62. See Krishnakumar, supra note 58.
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equal access to the process so that they may compete with and counter each
other, but equality does not require that every one in the polity have an equal
voice with respect to every legislative matter. By contrast, disclosure is particu-
larly valuable in the lobbying context because it gives legislators a greater un-
derstanding of the pressures to which they are subject; informs individuals and
interest groups of the activities of their competitors; and has the potential to
improve the public's understanding of its government.
C. Prevention of Improper Influence
Prevention of improper influence over government decision-making is a
primary concern for both campaign finance and lobbying regulation. Prevention
of corruption-particularly "quid pro quo arrangements" and the broader con-
cern that "politicians" will be "too compliant with the wishes of large contribu-
tors" 63-is the primary justification recognized by the Supreme Court for limit-
ing contributions to candidates, political parties, and political committees. The
prevention of improper influence is also a central focus of lobbying regulation.
The host of restrictions on gifts to public officials;64 on the payment or provi-
sion of meals, entertainment, or travel expenses; 65 the restrictions on "revolv-
ing door" employment of former legislators and legislative staffs as lobbyists;
66
and even rules governing the lobbying activities to legislators' family mem-
bers 67 are all aimed at curbing the ability of private interests to influence public
action through the provision of private benefits.
Indeed, campaign finance law and lobbying regulation are increasingly
converging in their focus on the control of improper influence. As BCRA and
McConnell demonstrate, campaign finance law now reflects a greater under-
standing of how campaign contributions and expenditures are used to open the
door for and enhance lobbying efforts.68 By the same token, a growing focus of
lobbying law is campaign finance. The next Part examines lobbying regula-
tion's new attention to the campaign finance activities of lobbyists.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF LOBBYING AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
A signal feature of the 2007 federal lobbying law is the requirement that
federal candidate campaign committees, political party committees, and leader-
ship PACs 69 disclose the bundled 70 contributions they receive from federally
63. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
64. See Honest Leadership Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 541 (2007).
65. See id §§ 543, 544.
66. See id §§ 101, 531-35.
67. See id. § 552.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
69. A leadership PAC is a committee organized and controlled by a federal office-
holder or federal candidate that receives and makes contributions to other federal candidates
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registered lobbyists that are in excess of $15,000 in a six-month period. The
provision is doubly unusual-and nicely exemplifies the interpenetration of
lobbying and campaign finance concerns-in adding a special restriction on
lobbyists to campaign finance law, and including an amendment to the cam-
paign law within an omnibus law generally focused on regulating lobbying.
The 2007 law however, may be only the tip of the iceberg. More than a
dozen states impose a variety of campaign finance restrictions aimed specifi-
cally at lobbyists. These include prohibiting lobbyists from making-and legis-
lators, state elected officials, and candidates for state or legislative office from
accepting--campaign contributions while the legislature is in session;7 1 requir-
ing lobbyists to disclose their campaign contributions in their lobbying re-
ports; 72 requiring lobbyists to disclose their bundled contributions in their lob-
bying reports; 73 banning bundling by lobbyists; 74 banning contributions by
lobbyists to legislators and other elected officials, 75 or, more narrowly, to the
elected officials they are registered to lobby;76 and prohibiting lobbyists from
organizing fundraisers or serving as campaign treasurers for candidates.
77
Moreover, during the summer of 2007, several of the leading contenders
for the Democratic nomination for president dueled over the role of lobbyists in
financing election campaigns. Speaking at the YearlyKos Presidential Leader-
ship Forum in August, former Senator John Edwards called on all Democratic
candidates to refuse to take any campaign contributions from federally regis-
tered lobbyists, 78 and Senator Barack Obama, who, like Edwards, did not ac-
but does not directly support the campaign of its controlling federal officeholder or candi-
date. See Honest Leadership Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 204(8)(B).
70. Under the Act, a bundled contribution is a contribution collected by an individual
and forwarded, along with similar contributions, to a candidate, party committee or leader-
ship PAC in such a way that the person collecting and forwarding the contributions and pre-
senting them to the candidate, party, or PAC is "credited by the committee or candidate in-
volved" for raising the money. See id.; see also supra note 4.
71. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1234.01 (2007) (restriction applies only to
incumbent officials not to nonofficeholder candidates); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-105.5
(2008) (restriction applies to both incumbents and candidates); UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-11-
305 (2007) (incumbents only); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 13.625 (West 2007) (incumbents and
candidates).
72. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-10-9 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.170 (2007);
see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(g) (2007) (requiring special campaign finance disclosure
of campaign contributions and expenditures by lobbyists).
73. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.170 (2007).
74. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 15-714(d)(1)(i) (West 2007); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-278.13C(b) (2007).
75. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13C(a) (2007).
76. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.074(g) (2007); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 85702 (2007);
S.C. CODE § 8-13-1314(A)(3) (2007).
77. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 15-714(d)(1)(ii), (iii) (2007).
78. Press Release, John Edwards '08, Edwards Calls on All Candidates for Federal Of-
fice to Join Him in Rejecting Donations From Federal Lobbyists (Aug. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.johnedwards.com/news/press-releases/20070804-lobbyist-donations/; John Ed-
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cept lobbyists' contributions, joined Edwards in criticizing Hillary Clinton for
accepting campaign donations from lobbyists. 79 Senator Clinton, in turn, de-
fended the representational role of lobbyists and criticized her critics for mak-
ing what she called an "artificial distinction" between lobbyists and "the people
who employ and hire lobbyists and give them their marching orders." 80 Al-
though Senators Edwards and Obama were calling for a self-denying practice
rather than a legal restriction, the question of limiting the campaign finance ac-
tivities of lobbyists is clearly on the regulatory agenda.
The new federal disclosure requirement, the state-level restrictions, and the
implicit suggestion that further federal limitations would be appropriate raise
both constitutional and policy concerns. In particular, as Senator Clinton con-
tends, they conflate the intersection of campaign finance and lobbying with the
campaign finance activities of lobbyists. It is the way in which individuals, or-
ganizations, and interest groups can use campaign finance and lobbying to-
gether to advance their private goals at potential cost to the public interest, and
not the campaign finance activities of lobbyists per se, that ought to be the pri-
mary focus of regulatory efforts.
The most common state provision restricting lobbyists' contributions, and
the one most frequently subject to constitutional challenge, is a ban on lobbyist
contributions while the legislature is in session. These have been struck down
by state courts or federal district courts in Alaska,8 1 Arkansas, 82 Florida, 83 and
Missouri. 84 In addition, a federal district court in Tennessee invalidated the ap-
plication of that state's ban on lobbyist contributions during the legislative ses-
sion to non-incumbent candidates for office, without addressing whether the
ban could constitutionally be applied to incumbents.
8 5
These courts concluded that the session contribution bans were flawed in
several ways. On the one hand they were overinclusive in applying to minimal
contributions that present no corruption danger, to elected statewide officials
"who are not part of the process of legislating," 86 and to nonincumbents. 87 By
wards, In His Own Words, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 24, 2007, at A15.
79. Jeff Zeleny, Democratic Rivals Spar at 'Netroots' Forum, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5,
2007, at A21.
80. Ruth Marcus, Democrats'Purity Primary, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2007, at A17.
81. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 630-31 (Alaska 1999).
82. Ark. Right to Life State PAC v. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d 540, 550-53 (W.D. Ark.
1998).
83. State v. Dodd, 561 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1990).
84. Trout v. State, 231 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. 2007); Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Maupin, 922
F. Supp. 1413 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
85. Emison v. Catalano, 951 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
86. Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552; accordDodd, 561 So. 2d at 265.
87. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 631 (Alaska 1999); Emison,
951 F. Supp. at 723; Maupin, 922 F. Supp. at 1422. The Alaska court determined that it
would be unconstitutional to apply the ban to nonincumbents and that limiting the ban to in-
cumbents "would fundamentally unbalance a restriction which the legislature clearly in-
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the same token, the bans were seen as underinclusive because they target con-
tributions only during the legislative session or shortly thereafter, thus failing
"to recognize the reality that corruption can occur anytime, even outside the
banned time period."'88 By taking a potentially large chunk of the year out of
the fund-raising process, the bans were said to help incumbents, as challengers
would have less time to overcome the built-in advantages incumbents enjoy.
89
Moreover, given the possibility of "unusually long" or extra legislative ses-
sions, they placed a burden on all fund-raising activity. 90
Two courts upheld bans on lobbyists' contributions during the legislative
session-the Vermont Supreme Court91 and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.92 The Fourth Circuit decision, in North Carolina Right
to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett93 provided the more substantial treatment of the consti-
tutional question. Bartlett minimized the burden of the North Carolina restric-
tion by pointing out that the legislature had been in session just one to two
months in election years over the prior two decades, 94 and it dismissed the
claim of incumbent advantage as no different from any other campaign finance
restriction that applies with formal neutrality to "incumbents and challengers
alike."'95 But the heart of Bartlett's reasoning, which is directly relevant to any
campaign finance restriction targeted at lobbyists, is that lobbyists present a
special threat to the integrity of the political process, a threat which is com-
pounded while the legislature is in session.
Chief Justice Wilkinson stressed that "lobbyists are paid to effectuate par-
ticular political outcomes .... While lobbyists do much to inform the legisla-
tive process, and their participation is in the main both constructive and honest,
there remain powerful hydraulic pressures at play which can cause both legisla-
tors and lobbyists to cross the line."'96 Moreover, the "pressure on [lobbyists] to
perform mounts as legislation winds its way through the system."'97 The legisla-
tive session is "that period during which the risk of an actual quid pro quo or
tended to apply to incumbents and challengers alike," Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d
at 63 1, so that it struck down the ban in its entirety. The Tennessee federal district court,
which considered only an as-applied challenge by a non-officeholder, limited its holding to
non-officeholders and did not consider the constitutionality of the application of the ban to
incumbents. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723. The Missouri federal district court relied on multi-
ple concerns, in addition to the overbroad application to nonincumbents, and so did not dis-
cuss the possibility of limiting its holding to nonincumbents. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. at 1422.
88. Maupin, 922 F. Supp. at 1422; accord Butler, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 552; Dodd, 561 So.
2d at 265-66.
89. Emison, 951 F. Supp. at 723; Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 565-66.
90. Dodd, 561 So. 2d at 264.
91. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 50-51 (Vt. 1995).
92. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1999).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 714.
95. Id. at 717.
96. Id. at 715-16.
97. Id.
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the appearance of one runs highest."'98
Chief Judge Wilkinson's reasoning appears to confuse the interests of the
lobbyist with the interest of her principal, that is the client who hired her to
lobby. While the lobbyist may be under "pressure... to perform" and will
surely benefit if the legislature takes the action the lobbyist is seeking, the pri-
mary beneficiary of the legislature's action is the individual, interest, or organi-
zation on whose behalf the lobbyist is lobbying. Sometimes, the lobbyist may
be lobbying for herself, for the organization to which she belongs, or for her
employer. But in many cases the lobbyist is an independent contractor hired by
a client or clients to represent the clients' interests. In those cases, and this ap-
pears to be the primary circumstance in which lobbyists make large campaign
contributions,9 9 the threat to the public interest comes from the danger that the
lobbyist may be able to use the contribution, and the gratitude it elicits, to sway
the legislator to vote the client's interest rather than the general public's. Lob-
byists, like the campaign contribution itself, are a means to the client's end. The
lobbyist will be compensated for her actions,10 0 but the moving force behind
both the lobbying and the campaign donation, and the real beneficiary of both,
will be the client.
Moreover, if the stakes for the client concerning a matter before the legisla-
ture are great enough, presumably the lobbyist will get the client to make a con-
tribution from the client's funds, or from the client's PAC, if the lobbyist is un-
able to make one herself. In other words, not only are lobbyists per se not the
problem, but limiting the contributions of lobbyists, without also limiting the
contributions of their clients, is not the solution. The bans on lobbyists' contri-
butions during the legislative session appear to be largely about symbolism, not
the substance of special interest dangers to the political process.
That does not mean these bans are unconstitutional. As Chief Judge Wil-
kinson pointed out in Bartlett, the Supreme Court has taken a relatively defer-
ential approach to contribution restrictions, finding that they place "'only a
marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communica-
tion."''10 1 A putative donor is still free to engage in independent expenditures in
98. Id. at 716. The Vermont court similarly minimized the impact of the session contri-
bution ban as "less burdensome" than the dollar contribution ceilings upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S 1 (1976). As the ban was limited to "a
narrow period during which legislators could be, or could appear to be, pressured, coerced,
or tempted to voting on the basis of cash contributions rather than on consideration of the
public weal," it was constitutional. Kimbell v. Hooper, 665 A.2d 44, 51 (Vt. 1995).
99. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 32, at 8-9.
100. Of course, in a state which permits contingent fee lobbying, the lobbyist's success
also affects her compensation. Moreover, even without a contingent fee, a success on one
lobbying matter may increase the lobbyist's future business. Nonetheless, unless the client is
acting irrationally and paying the lobbyist more than the benefit to the client is worth, the
bulk of the benefit for any lobbying success must run to the client.
101. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 715 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 20-2 1); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386-89 (2000).
2008]
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
support of or opposition to a candidate or otherwise become involved in politi-
cal campaigns. Depending on the length of the legislative session, a temporal
restriction could be less burdensome to both lobbyist-donors and the candidates
they would support than the monetary ceilings on contributions that the Su-
preme Court has upheld.102 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the pre-
vention of the appearance of corruption is, in addition to corruption itself, a jus-
tification for restricting contributions, 10 3 and contributions by lobbyists directly
involved in the legislative process to legislators while the legislature is actively
considering legislation may create a particularly acute appearance problem.
Certainly, there is much to Chief Judge Wilkinson's argument that when a leg-
islature makes an "effort ... to protect itself from the damaging effects of cor-
ruption... the proper judicial posture should be one of restraint."10 4 The real
objection to the bans on lobbyists' contributions during the legislative session
is that they are mistargeted and too narrow, not that they are necessarily uncon-
stitutional.
The same policy concerns recur, while the constitutional objections grow
stronger, with respect to the broader bans on lobbyists' campaign contributions.
In 1979, the California Supreme Court struck down a complete prohibition on
lobbyists' campaign contributions, adopted by voter initiative in 1974. The
California Supreme Court found the ban, which applied to donations "to any
and all candidates even though the lobbyist may never have occasion to lobby
the candidate," fatally overbroad. 10 5 The court also noted that the proscription
"does not discriminate between small and large but prohibits all contributions.
Thus, it is not narrowly directed to the aspects of political association where
potential corruption might be identified." 106 Two decades later a federal district
court upheld a somewhat more tightly focused ban, adopted by California vot-
ers in 2001, which prohibits lobbyists from making contributions only to those
candidates running for offices the lobbyist has registered to lobby. 10 7 The
Alaska Supreme Court sustained a somewhat broader ban-albeit less than a
complete prohibition--on contributions by lobbyists to candidates in legislative
districts outside the district in which the lobbyist is eligible to vote.
108
Both the Alaska and California courts minimized the burden on lobbyists'
102. Kimbell, 665 A.2d at 51.
103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.
104. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 717-18.
105. Fair Political Practices Comm. v. Super. Ct., 599 P.2d 46, 52 (Cal. 1979).
106. Id. at 53.
107. Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair Political Practices Comm., 164 F. Supp.
2d 1183, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2001). In addition, the 2001 law was adopted after the definition of
lobbyist had been narrowed to exclude individuals for whom lobbying constitutes less than
one-third of their compensated time, and lobbying was redefined to exclude the giving of
administrative testimony. Id. The inclusion of administrative testimony in the definition of
lobbying had particularly troubled the California Supreme Court in 1979. See Fair Political
Practices v. Super. Ct., 599 P.2d at 52-53.
108. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 617-20 (Alaska 1999).
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rights posed by the restrictions, noting that lobbyists remained free to undertake
independent expenditures, 109 contribute to political parties,1 10 and volunteer on
behalf of any legislative candidate. I Il More significantly, the courts upheld the
states' decisions to subject lobbyists, and not their clients, to special restric-
tions. The California federal district court acknowledged that the California re-
striction did not preclude lobbyists' clients from making contributions, but con-
cluded that the state was "not required to address all evils at once"1 12 and could
limit its restriction to the lobbyists. The court also briefly contended that lobby-
ists' contributions presented a distinct danger of corruption and of the appear-
ance of corruption because lobbyists' "continued employment depends on their
success in influencing legislative action."1 13 The Alaska court made a stronger
case that lobbyists' contributions "create special risks of actual or apparent cor-
ruption," unlike the risks posed by ordinary donors, because "of the lobbyist's
special role in the legislative system."" 14 In particular, the lobbyist's incentive
to make contributions to large numbers of legislators who are "in position to
introduce or thwart legislation and to vote in committees or on the floor on mat-
ters of professional interest to the lobbyist ... creates a very real perception of
influence-buying."l 
15
Again, as with the Fourth Circuit's appraisal of the legislative session con-
tribution ban, these courts appear to mistake the agent for the principal. The
real sources of potentially improper influence are not the lobbyists but the cli-
ents whom they represent. While the lobbyists may have special strategic
knowledge about the state of legislative developments and special incentives to
get contributions to particular members at particular times to gain the access
necessary for them to make the case for a particular legislative measure, it is
generally a client's case they are making. It is not clear, then, why lobbyists'
contributions present a "special risk" of corruption compared with the risk of
corruption generated by the contribution of any individual, organization, or in-
terest group that has retained a lobbyist to represent its interests concerning a
bill pending before the legislature. The handful of other cases in which courts
have upheld contribution prohibitions have involved industries like casino
gambling, liquor sales, or municipal securities that are particularly closely regu-
lated by government, and thus raise a special danger of improper influence.
Moreover, those cases involved rules or statutes that focused on the princi-
pals-that is, the industries that were the source of the potential undue influ-
109. Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1193; Alaska Civil Liberties
Union, 978 P.2d at 619.
110. Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1192-93; Alaska Civil Liber-
ties Union, 978 P.2d at 619.
111. Inst. of Governmental Advocates, 164 F.Supp.2d at 1193.
112. Idat 1194.
113. Id. at 1193-94.
114. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d at 619.
115. Id.
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ence problem-not their legislative advocates. 1 1 6
To be sure, a state need not address all aspects of the undue influence prob-
lem at once, and it may be that lobbyists, with their more intimate knowledge
of the legislative process, are in a position to use their campaign contributions
more effectively than are their clients-although presumably they would be
busily advising those clients about when and to whom to make contributions.
But the more burdensome the restriction, the more narrowly tailored the restric-
tion ought to be to the corruption danger, and a general ban is certainly more
restrictive than a temporal prohibition tied to the legislative session. Certainly,
the Alaska court's concern that a lobbyist might be able to spread cash
throughout the legislature could be met by something less restrictive than a ban,
such as a ceiling on aggregate contributions by lobbyists, or even by a lower
monetary ceiling for lobbyist donations.
The California and Alaska restrictions might still pass constitutional mus-
ter. The California law, in particular, is tightly focused on donations by a lob-
byist to candidates for the elective office lobbied, suggesting some nexus to the
danger of corruption, while the Alaska law preserves the lobbyist's right to par-
ticipate financially in elections directly affecting her representation. By target-
ing only lobbyists, both laws surely avoid the argument that they impair the
ability of candidates to raise enough money for effective advocacy-a consid-
eration which has been the increasing focus of the Supreme Court in assessing
the constitutionality of contribution limits. 117 These laws also leave lobbyists
other opportunities to participate in election campaigns. 118 And they are cer-
tainly responsive to concerns about the "appearance of corruption."
But even if constitutional, such laws appear unwise. They rely on the exer-
cise of one constitutional right-lobbying-to impose a very tight restriction on
another right-making contributions. Although large contributions may be a
source of undue influence, contributions are a constitutionally protected form
of political participation, so that a complete ban is troubling. Moreover, by
separating lobbyists from the interests they represent, these laws provide only
116. See, e.g., Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding regulation re-
stricting the ability of municipal securities professionals to contribute to the political cam-
paigns of state officials from whom they solicit or obtain business); In re Soto, 565 A.2d
1088 (N.J. Super. 1989) (upholding ban on political contributions by key casino gambling
employees); Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61 (111. 1976) (upholding
ban on contributions by liquor licensees, and their affiliates, to political parties or candi-
dates).
117. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000).
118. Absolute prohibitions, like the California law invalidated in Fair Political Prac-
tices Commission v. Superior Court, 599 P.2d 46, 52 (Cal. 1979), or the ban on lobbyist con-
tributions to legislators and "public servants" (other than the lobbyist's contribution to his or
her own campaign) recently adopted by North Carolina, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 347, and the
similar prohibition on "communicator lobbyists" recently adopted by Connecticut, see
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 9-610(g), (h) (2008), are far more problematic.
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the illusion of addressing the impact of interested donations on the legislative
process. Underinclusiveness may not be constitutionally fatal, but it supports an
inference that such laws are likely to be ineffective. The better approach would
be to look beyond the campaign finance activities of lobbyists to the linkages
between campaign finance and lobbying more generally.
Such an approach makes sense even for laws that raise little or no constitu-
tional difficulty, such as disclosure. The disclosure of bundled contributions is
an important step towards a better understanding of the nature and scope of in-
terest group efforts to influence the legislative process. But it is not clear why
campaign committees should have to report only those contributions bundled
by lobbyists, as the new federal law requires, or why only lobbyists should
have to report their bundling activities, as some states have begun to require. 119
Bundling is a problem because it creates the danger that an officeholder will
feel a sense of gratitude and a concomitant obligation to the bundler who has
managed to solicit, collect, and transmit a large number of contributions to the
officeholder's campaign. The possibility of gratitude and obligation derives
from all bundling, or, at least, the bundling of substantial sums, regardless of
whether the bundler is a registered lobbyist, or is, instead, the client who retains
the lobbyist. The public information value of bundling disclosure would be
greater when the principals as well as the agents are revealed.
Indeed, some state laws recognize that it is the interaction of lobbying and
campaign finance, not the campaign activities of lobbyists per se, that should be
the primary focus of regulation. Michigan, for example, requires the reporting
and disclosure of bundled contributions generally, without specifically target-
ing lobbyists. 120 Minnesota caps the fraction of total contributions a candidate
can receive from a category of donors that consists of lobbyists, political action
committees, political funds, and large contributors; 12 1 this recognizes that lob-
byists are just a piece of the special interest problem, not a distinctive problem
in their own right. 122 Nor is there any difficulty in requiring lobbyists to dis-
close their campaign contributions 123 or their bundled contributions in their
lobbying reports, 124 at least as long as campaign committees and other political
committees are required to report all contributions and all bundled contribu-
tions, above a certain threshold. Such double reporting can make it easier to
trace the interactions of influence without presuming that lobbyists are uniquely
influential.
Treating lobbyists as essentially agents of clients is the best general ap-
119. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.170 (2007).
120. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 169.226 (2007).
121. MrNN. STAT. § 10A.27 (2007).
122. The Eighth Circuit upheld the aggregate contribution limit as a matter closely
drawn to limit special interest influence. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Kelley,
427 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2005).
123. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 22-10-9 (2007).
124. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 42.17.170 (2007).
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proach to the intersection of lobbying and campaign finance. 125 But there may
be some exceptional cases in which restrictions aimed at lobbyists per se are
appropriate. Maryland, for example, prohibits a lobbyist from serving as a
campaign treasurer for a candidate or elected official, serving on a candidate's
fundraising committee, or organizing or establishing a political committee for
the purpose of soliciting or transmitting contributions. 126 The Maryland federal
district court upheld these restrictions with little discussion, noting simply that
these relationships posed a danger of corruption and that, in fact, the Maryland
legislature had acted after "an actual influence peddling scandal" involving a
lobbyist. 12 7 Although lobbyists' campaign contributions may not present
unique risks, other activities-such as serving as a campaign treasurer, estab-
lishing a committee, or sitting on a fundraising committee-raise different con-
cerns. Such actions represent a far greater commitment to the candidate's cam-
paign, and thus are a potentially far greater source of candidate gratitude and
lobbyist influence than merely making a donation. People active in the legisla-
tive process regularly make contributions for "access," not because they par-
ticularly support the candidates to whom they are donating. Indeed, making a
campaign contribution is a cost of doing legislative business, and it is a com-
mon practice for donors to give to both parties and to competing candidates. 128
But a direct involvement in the candidate's campaign indicates personal sup-
port and is likely to be recognized, and potentially rewarded, as such. So, too,
campaign contributions, particularly if bundled with contributions from clients,
may be seen as aimed at obtaining access or actions for particular clients and
thus primarily benefit them, but the lobbyist's personal involvement in the cam-
paign is unlikely to be connected to any particular client and so will benefit the
lobbyist personally, and, perhaps, ultimately benefit future clients generally.
Although lobbyists generally are instruments for advancing the interests of
employers or clients, there may be instances in which they become power bro-
kers and sources of influence in their own right, which carry beyond the repre-
sentation of specific clients. 12 9 Campaign activities which involve a distinct
personal role for the lobbyist and forge particularly strong links between the
lobbyist and the candidate can do that. These give the lobbyist opportunities for
undue influence which the lobbyist can then use for his personal benefit and for
the benefit of future clients later. These might reasonably be subject to limita-
125. Cf Honest Leadership Act, Pub. L. No. 110-81, § 541 (2007) (applying the gift
ban to "a private entity that retains or employs a registered lobbyist" as well as to lobbyists
themselves).
126. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 15-714(d)(1)(ii),(iii) (West 2007).
127. Md. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Weathersbee, 975 F. Supp. 791,
796-98 (D. Md. 1997).
128. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 32, at 8 (noting that of the "nearly 1000 lobbyists
who have contributed at least $20,000 to members of Congress since 1998, more than thir-
teen percent (132) have given at least two-fifths of their contributions to each major party").
129. See id. (noting the role of leading lobbyists in organizing fundraisers for members
of Congress).
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tion.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a brief, preliminary inquiry into the relationship be-
tween campaign finance and lobbying. It addresses only the most basic ques-
tions concerning the purposes and scope of the different regimes addressing
campaign finance and lobbying. Many important issues, such as the specific
questions posed by the regulation of grassroots lobbying or the possibility of
public efforts to support lobbying by underrepresented groups, are beyond its
scope. The article will have accomplished its purpose, however, if it has gotten
readers to think about campaign finance regulation and lobbying law as ad-
dressing different facets of a common concern with the structure of the political
process. Comparing and contrasting the campaign finance and lobbying re-
gimes will help us to better understand the particular issues raised by each prac-
tice. Looking at campaign finance and lobbying together may improve our ap-
preciation of the connections between the two activities, and to take those
connections into account in drafting the laws that deal with each activity.
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